Guide // MandateGuard
What is an interoperable intent service for agent mandates?
By the Ingenious AI team · Published 2026-11-14 · Reviewed 2026-11-14
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Short answer
An interoperable intent service is a shared registry for agent mandates: one intent object — principal, agent, merchant scope, cumulative and per-period budgets, authority window, status — that the agent buys against, the merchant verifies receipts against, and the issuer manages, each through role-scoped keys. MandateGuard's service is AP2-style and aligned with the EMVCo draft framework; issuers write state, merchants and agents hold read-and-verify keys only, and every authorisation, refund and adjustment lands in the intent's own hash-chained event log. One state, independently checkable by every party — that is the interoperability.
What does interoperable mean for an intent service?
Interoperability here means shared reference, not shared control. The issuer writes state: registration, status changes, events posted through proper channels. Merchants and agents with role keys read state and verify receipts. The service registers and retrieves mandate and intent state and records approvals made inside MandateGuard's policy plane; it does not issue agent identity credentials and does not publish behaviour or reputation scores — those belong to other products by design.
The problem: three parties, three versions of the truth
When an agent buys from a merchant under a customer's mandate, each party traditionally keeps its own record. The customer's platform shows one budget figure, the agent's framework logs another, and the merchant sees only an order and a payment. Disagreements are resolved by exchanging screenshots. An interoperable intent service replaces the three versions with one object: the intent, registered once, carrying budgets, scope, window and status, which every party reads through its own appropriately-scoped access. Interoperability is therefore a state-sharing property before it is a standards property: the same numbers, the same status, the same history, available to everyone with a legitimate interest and no one else.
Anatomy of the service
MandateGuard's service has four moving parts. The registry holds intents and serves them by ID. The authorisation path links spends to intents, decrementing budgets atomically on ALLOW and chaining receipts into the intent's event log. The event path appends post-transaction reality — refunds, adjustments, chargeback notes — with budget effects, hash-chained like everything else. And the verification path lets any authorised party check a receipt against an intent across four dimensions: hash, signature, workspace chain and intent linkage. Around those sit role-scoped keys that decide who may touch which part: issuers write, merchants and agents verify. The registry UI shows budget gauges and chain timelines so the shared state is human-readable, not just API-deep.
Role-scoped access as the trust model
Shared state fails without differentiated access. If a merchant could edit budgets, the intent would be worthless to the issuer; if merchants could not read state independently, they would be trusting the agent's claims. Role keys resolve this: issuer keys register and manage; merchant and agent keys read and verify only — they can confirm a receipt and view an intent, and they cannot register, modify or suspend anything. Keys are minted by the issuer from the registry, labelled per party, and revocable individually. The model generalises a familiar pattern from payments — different credentials for different privileges — to mandate state, and it is what lets verification be genuinely independent rather than theatrical.
Events: keeping shared state truthful after purchase
Shared budgets rot quickly if only purchases update them. Real commerce includes refunds that should restore budget, adjustments that should correct it, and chargebacks that everyone needs noted. The intent event log accepts those post-transaction events against the intent, applies their budget effect, and chains them with the authorisations into one history. A checker reading the intent in month three therefore sees not an optimistic registration document but a maintained record: what was authorised, what came back, what is actually spent. That maintenance is what separates a registry from a directory — the state is alive, and its liveness is verifiable.
Alignment and honest scope
The service is described precisely: AP2-style mandates, aligned with the EMVCo draft framework for agentic payments — a draft dated September 2026, with alignment claimed and certification not claimed. Scope is stated with the same precision. The service registers, references and retrieves mandate state and records approvals made inside MandateGuard's policy plane. It never issues agent identity credentials; agent identity is Agent Passport's product. It never publishes agent behaviour or reputation scores; MandateGuard's vendor trust stays inside the workspace that earned it. Those exclusions are interoperability features, not gaps: parties integrating the service know exactly which claims it makes, and can compose it with identity and reputation systems of their own choosing.
Adopting the service in a real relationship
Adoption works best at the start of a commercial relationship, when keys and IDs can be exchanged as part of onboarding. The issuer registers a modest first intent — bounded budget, named merchants, a single period — and the counterparty integrates the cheapest verification that fits its flow: the API check at order time for automated merchants, the registry UI for manual ones. Early shared incidents (a suspension, a refund event) should be treated as joint drills that prove the state really is shared. Once the pattern holds, intents can carry larger budgets and longer windows, because the parties have evidence — from the chain itself — that they all see the same mandate.
Five actions to take now
- Decide which mandates genuinely need outside verification before registering intents
- Issue role keys per party and per function; merchants never get write access
- Share the intent_id and verification path with counterparties in writing
- Monitor intent gauges and chains alongside workspace receipts
- Suspend first when a shared mandate misbehaves — it is reversible
Worked example: suspension seen identically by everyone
A marketplace issuer registers an intent for a verified seller's restocking agent: scope, the marketplace's two fulfilment merchants; total budget 5,000 dollars; per-period 1,250 dollars per 30 days. The agent buys against the intent through the API; one merchant integrates the verify-receipt check at its order desk, the other uses the registry UI weekly.
Mid-quarter the issuer suspends the intent for a day during a pricing investigation. Every checker sees the same suspended state within the same hour; the agent's authorisations under the intent pause; the merchants stop honouring new mandate-backed orders while honouring the already-receipted ones. Resumption is equally unambiguous. No party had to phone another to establish what the mandate's state was — that is the operational meaning of interoperable.
Frequently asked questions
What can a merchant key do?
Read intents and verify receipts. It cannot register, modify, suspend or post spending events — verification without write access is the security model.
How do parties get the intent_id?
The issuer shares it at registration time, out of band or in the flow that establishes the commercial relationship. The ID is a reference, not a secret credential.
Does the service work over MCP too?
Yes — the same intent state is exposed through intent MCP tools (register, get, list, authorize, event, verify_receipt), sharing state with the API and UI.
What standards does it align with?
It is AP2-style and aligned with the EMVCo draft framework for agentic payments (draft 1, September 2026). Alignment is stated honestly as draft alignment, not certification.
What is explicitly out of scope?
Issuing agent identity credentials (Agent Passport's role) and publishing reputation scores. The service handles mandate state only.
Keep reading
- What is an AP2-style intent mandate for agent payments?
- How do role-scoped keys work for issuers, merchants and agents?
- How do merchants verify an agent's receipt against an intent?
Put the policy in force: spend envelopes · intent registry · approval inbox · how the proof works · all MandateGuard guides